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  The Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 is one of the most 
prominent international humanitarian treaty in world history.  It entered into force 
quicker than any other treaty and currently only two countries (the United States 
and Somalia) have not ratified it.
1   Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, 
says that the Convention has become “the centerpiece of a global movement, a 
movement that reflects a growing awareness of the importance of safeguarding 
human rights—and child rights in particular.”
2  Similarly, Lisbet Palme claimed, 
after travelling to some of the worst conflict zones in Africa, that, “For many of the 
children I have met and talked with, the Convention takes on a very meaningful 
reality.”
3  Yet, during the 1990’s, more children in Africa became victims of, and 
combatants in, war than at any time in history.  Partially as a result, a bitter 
Human Rights Watch Report assessing the state of children’s rights ten years 
after the Convention on the Rights of Children came into force was entitled 
Promises Broken.
4  Indeed, to enhance further international humanitarian law 
protecting children during war, governments agreed in January 2000, after six 
years of negotiations, to an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child that raises the minimum age of combatants to eighteen. 
  This paper analyzes the politics of international humanitarian law that 
attempts to protect children in Africa during war.  Examining how the international 
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community attempts to protect the least powerful when normal political 
institutions have broken down and the rule of the gun prevails is the ultimate test 
for international humanitarian law.  Indeed, the dichotomy between the law of war 
and the nature of war has been called, “probably the must acute point of tension 
between law and life.”
5  Children have often been a central focus of international 
humanitarian law: the first global charter protecting a particular sector of society 
was the 1924 Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child that was prompted 
by concerns over young people affected by conflict in the Balkans.
6  There has 
since been a succession of international instruments seeking to protect children,  
including the Convention on the Rights of the Child which now occupies an 
extremely important position in international humanitarian law. 
Despite the widespread enthusiasm for protection of children via 
international law and the seemingly palpable failure to affect behavior that hurts 
youngsters, there has been almost no critical review of the large compliance gap 
between norms and practices in this area.  Most of the discussion of these new 
international humanitarian instruments has been by what Finnemore and Sikkink 
call “norm entrepreneurs”
7 who are deeply vested in the promulgation of ever 
more elaborate international legal instruments.  Yet, as Finnemore and Sikkink 
note, understanding how norms become law and the patterns of compliance with 
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those laws are critical topics at the nexus of international relations and law.
8  In 
particular, the law of domestic armed conflict 
 stretches the idea of law to its very limits. . . In guerrilla wars and in 
occupied territories the restraints imposed by the law of war appear to be 
particularly fragile. The parts of the law of war which have been most 
effective are often difficult to apply in guerrilla wars.  Guerillas depend on 
mobility;  they often do not control a secure territory suitable for detention 
of prisoners;  and the usually lack the administrative and judicial 
infrastructure which eases the law’s application.”
9 
As the toughest case for international humanitarian law, the new rules protecting 
children will have obvious enforcement problems.  However, their lofty ambitions 
can help tell us if the international community should continue to set law which, 
while noble, has little chance of enforcement in the near future because of 
implementation problems or if setting the goals high is an important effort in and 
of itself by helping chart the course the international society should eventually 
travel. 
Africa is a particularly appropriate region to examine the evolution of 
international humanitarian law.  In addition to rapidly adopting the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, African states were the first to have their own regional 
instrument focussing on the rights of the child:  The African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child that was agreed to in 1990.  At the same time, Africa is 
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home to a very large proportion of the conflicts that most endanger children:  civil 
wars where the battlefield is dynamic and largely undefined, guerilla groups are 
often inchoate bands whose primary goals sometimes appears to be pillage, and 
civilians take up arms to protect themselves or to form new factions. Two million 
of the estimated three million civilian casualties in the 1980’s were in Africa, a 
change from previous decades when most civilian war deaths were in Asia.
10  
When the tallies for the 1990’s are finished, the wars in Angola, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 
Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere will assure that Africa 
was again the most dangerous continent for civilians, especially children. 
Finally, examining how international humanitarian law can affect children 
is especially informative in understanding how sovereignty may evolve.  Laws of 
war, especially laws that hope to regulate the prosecution of domestic conflicts, 
are an inherent challenge to sovereignty. As Chadwick notes, “When 
autonomous state competence to interpret authoritatively the nature of organized 
domestic violence is in question, the legal expression of the continuing fact of 
sovereignty is placed in doubt.”
11  In fact, some of the new provisions affecting 
children are being promoted precisely by networks of non-governmental 
organizations that want to challenge an international system that privileges state 
actions.  As an influential book on human rights activists claimed, “All of our 
networks challenge traditional notions of sovereignty. . . Much international 
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network activity presumes . . . [that] it is both legitimate and necessary for states 
or nonstate actors to be concerned about the treatment of the inhabitants of 
another state.”
12  Yet, to add to the complexity of the political processes, the new 
international humanitarian law that non-governmental organizations want is 
developed by conferences of sovereign states.  That activists celebrate new 
international law as diminishing sovereignty after the provisions have been 
adopted by conferences consisting of recognized states only exemplifies the 
confused nature of sovereignty in the twenty-first century.         
Again, Africa is the best region to understand how the continuing 
development of international norms concerning human rights affects sovereignty.  
As the weakest group of countries in the world, African states are, by necessity, 
vitally concerned about their sovereign status.  In particular, laws of war that 
affect children are explicitly aimed at altering the behavior of rebels.  African 
states obviously want as much assistance as possible in regulating the behavior 
of rebels.  However, they want to avoid, at almost any cost, having any type of 
international recognition, especially in the form of a legal personality, bestowed 
on groups viewed by the state as criminals and thugs rather than as participants 
in a belligerency as classically understood in international law.  Nat Colletta, the 
head of the World Bank’s post-conflict unit, and Taies Nezam seem to affirm the 
fears of African states when they argue that, “’international norms and values’ 
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(human rights) further inadvertently supplant the state, reducing the capacity of 
the state to impose its will.”
13   
Regulating rebel entities without recognizing them is an extraordinary 
conundrum. Yet for international humanitarian law, developed primarily to 
regulate war between states, to be relevant in the twenty-first century, it must 
come to grips with the fact that almost all warfare in the world is domestic. The 
challenge to sovereignty is likely to only increase in the future as people across 
Africa become frustrated with the slow progress of conflict resolution.  A recent 
conference in West Africa focussing on the rights of children during conflict 
concluded that, “The flexible interpretation of the principle of ‘non-interference’ in 
the internal affairs of member Sates—which has enabled OUA to undertake 
creative initiatives in peace-building and resolution—should be strengthened to 
reflect the dynamism of African common bonds and traditional norms of shared 
responsibility for the welfare of every member of the community, be it intra- or 
across borders.”
14 
  The international effort to use humanitarian law to protect African children 
during times of war is therefore at the center of a number of theoretical and policy 
concerns:  What is the role of international norms in affecting state action?  Can 
these norms get so ahead of state behavior that they only produce cynicism or 
does the international community do best by setting the bar high and then 
pressuring states and other parties to conflicts to follow even if, in the near term, 
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complete compliance is lacking? Finally, how do states and non-governmental 
actors reconcile claims to sovereignty with the increasing intrusiveness of 
international humanitarian law? Given that other international efforts to affect 
domestic behavior in trade, environmental protection, and other aspects of the 
law of war (e.g., landmines) are also being propounded by activists through 
international conferences of sovereign states, this paper will explore how a 
critical aspect of sovereignty is likely to evolve in the twenty-first century. 
Wars and Children in Africa 
  War as a public health threat to African children is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  The traditional concern for the child south of the Sahara has been 
material deprivation and disease.  For instance, in an account of the International 
Conference on African Children held in Geneva in 1931, Evelyn Sharp noted, 
“Children in Africa suffer cruelties, but not because people are cruel to them.”
15  
Similarly, UNICEF’s major 1963 study The Needs of Children did not even list 
armed hostilities as a significant threat to children.
16 
  However, since the mid-1980’s, two phenomena—the dramatic increase in 
civil unrest in Africa and the increasing likelihood for most casualties of war to be 
civilian—have combined to endanger Africa children.  As is now widely 
recognized, the clear trend in combat since World War II has been for civilians to 
suffer an increasing share of total casualties.  The proportion of civilian deaths 
and casualties  has risen from less than ten percent in World War I to over fifty 
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percent in World War II to more than seventy-five percent in the current period. In 
the one hundred and twenty-seven armed conflicts between World War II and 
1990, twenty-two million people are estimated to have died of whom one and a 
half million were children.  A further four million children have been physically 
disabled and ten million psychologically traumatized.
17  The nature of civil wars in 
Africa causes civilians to be especially prone to victimization.  Indeed, a review of 
conflict in West Africa concluded, 
‘total war’ is increasingly being waged  within national boundaries.  
Nothing is spared in the quest for power and control—not crops, not 
women, children, schools, health-care facilities or places of worship.  . . 
Children and women constitute the overwhelming majority among the 
uprooted millions in the [West African] subregion and other trouble spots 
in Africa.  These wars are characterized by the indiscriminate destruction 
of lives and property and unprecedented numbers of human rights 
violations against children and women.
18 
The disembowlment of pregnant women to kill their fetuses in Rwanda, the use 
of amputation as a terror tactic in Sierra Leone, cannibalism and desecration of 
bodies in Liberia, the destruction of whole communities in Sudan, and the forced 
recruitment of civilians to promote the war aims of rebels in Mozambique and 
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Angola are only some of the most glaring examples of how civilians are no longer 
collateral casualties during war but, rather, the major targets.
19 
In particular, the last decade has seen the emergence of the child soldier 
in Africa as a particularly devastating phenomenon.  The advent of advanced 
technology weapons means that even small boys and girls (although they are 
overwhelmingly boys) can handle weapons like M16 and AK47 assault rifles.
20  
These weapons are also now widely available at a low cost:  in Uganda an AK47 
costs no more than a chicken and in northern Kenya it is the price of a goat.
21   A 
rough estimate suggests that there are currently 120,000 children under eighteen 
in armed conflicts across Africa, some no more than seven or eight years old.
22 
Children are used because they are obedient,  are expendable, and because 
they often do not even realize that they are killing other people.  They can also 
be brutally exploited because they are so vulnerable.  For instance, in 
Mozambique, a typical RENAMO tactic was to force children to return to their 
home village and kill someone.  They therefore had to fight for RENAMO 
because they had no home to go back to.
23   Finally, it is estimated that there will 
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be ten million orphans in Africa due to the AIDS early in the twenty-first century.
24  
These children will be especially vulnerable to being coerced into fighting. 
Children sometime form a significant portion of those at war in Africa.  For 
instance, it is estimated that of the 40,000 to 60,000 fighters in the Liberian civil 
war (1989-1997), ten percent were under fifteen and another twenty percent 
were between fifteen and seventeen. In that war, children as young as nine or 
ten armed with automatic rifles man checkpoints where they terrorize and kill 
civilians for no obvious reason.
25  The Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army  is 
said to have taken 12,500 children who it thought were ready to fight (as 
indicated by the presence of two molar teeth) across 1,200 miles of desert in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s.
26 Thousands of young child soldiers, known as 
“kadogo” (the little ones), were used by Laurent Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of the Congo when he was fighting to overthrown 
Mobutu Sese Seko in 1996 and 1997.
27 In the war in Sierra Leone, in just 1998, 
members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the Revolutionary 
United Front abducted thousands of civilians, including  a high percentage of 
children, to use as combatants, forced labor, or sexual slaves.
28  In Uganda, the 
Lords Resistance Army, a rebel group trying to overthrow the government of 
Yoweri Museveni, has kidnapped several thousand children, some after watching 
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their parents killed, to be used in combat, to raid and loot villages, as porters, and 
as sex slaves  for LRA commanders.
29  
International Law and Rebellion in Africa 
  Early humanitarian law towards children, including the 1924 Geneva 
Declaration and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted in 1959, 
focussed on their material needs.
30  The effort to protect children during times of 
war is therefore fairly recent and has collided with the long and confused effort to 
humanely regulate how men kill each other. The immediate problem confronting 
activists and states who sought to provide greater protection to children is that 
large parts of international humanitarian law that govern the conduct of war, 
including the Hague Regulations, apply to wars between states.  Most of the 
Geneva Convention only applies to Contracting Parties and therefore to not apply 
to most situations of domestic conflict.
31 
To rectify this situation meant working through the United Nations system 
and through conferences of sovereign states.  Of course, this is a system biased 
clearly toward preserving the rights of states since states founded the UN and 
are the principle actors in conferences designed to write new international law.  
The United Nations Charter itself indicates how protective the current 
international system is of what are seen as the prerogatives of states charter 
(Article 2.7):  “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
                                                 
29   Human Rights Watch, The Scars of Death:  Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army 
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Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter.”  The language is actually broader than the 
League of Nations’ Covenant.
32  For instance, in article eight of the League 
Covenant, the League’s Council was given the responsibility for reducing the 
arms held by each nation to the absolute minimum possible.  As a result of 
privileging sovereignty, the entire UN system is, “dependent upon consensual 
reciprocity.  Whether international humanitarian law is actively implemented, or 
merely made applicable as a code of conduct, remains largely a function of state 
authoritative interpretation.
33  
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
In 1949, nations did adopt common Article 3 to all four of the Geneva 
conventions which bound signatories to observe humanitarian principles in 
“armed conflicts not of an international character.”  The article prohibited each 
party to a conflict from “a)  violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  b) taking hostages;  c)  outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”
 34  
However, governments have resisted the application of Article 3 because 
it limits, perhaps severely, their ability to prosecute a civil war and to use 
domestic and municipal law to try what they see as criminals and bandits. As a 
result, “the applicability of the Article has been skirted in even the most massive 
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Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 50. 
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internal conflicts since 1949.   Governments. . . have sought to preserve 
maximum flexibility, in the national interest, in dealing with internal armed conflict 
by avoiding such formal international legal obligation. . . (as) might . . .attach in 
favor of a challenging group. . . by virtue of their treatment by the incumbent in 
any manner as a legal personality.”
35   
However, even had states chosen to obey Article 3, its protections with 
regard to children are suspect. Chadwick notes that the article does not define 
“armed conflict,” making the observance of its minimal provisions “largely 
discretionary.”
36  The protection offered children is strikingly minimal.  As Cohn 
and Goodwin-Gill have observed, “Common Article 3 places no limits on 
recruitment or participation of children, the breaches of rules are committed by 
NGE’s [non-governmental entities], the level of strife is debatable, the 
applicability of human rights provisions is in doubt, and their enforcement, for 
various reasons, impossible.”
37  As a result, “whether or not there is a lacuna in 
the law and what this consists of, there is certainly a lacuna in practice.”
38 
The flaws inherent to Article 3 are hardly accidental. Having been forced 
by the weight of international opinion to accept that Article 3 did apply to a wide 
range of conflicts, states have done very little to enhance the protection offered 
so that their sovereignty is not impinged upon.  As a result, it was understood by 
the 1970’s, even before civil wars came to be the predominant type of conflict, 
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that  Article 3 by itself simply was an inadequate guide to the protection of 
civilians, including children, during warfare. 
The Optional Protocols to the Geneva Convention 
  It is a telling lesson that the impetus for the Option Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions came from Sean MacBride in his role as chair of the 
International Commission of Jurists.  MacBride argued before and during the 
1968 United Nations human rights conference in Tehran that there should be 
much greater international regulation of domestic conflicts.  He therefore 
proposed a sudden and whole scale revision of international doctrine regarding 
the laws of war.  His was a dramatic early example of a non-governmental 
organization attempting to redraft international humanitarian law through a 
conference of sovereign states.
39   
While most of MacBride’s ambitions were not realized, in 1977, two 
optional protocols were added to the Geneva Convention.  Protocol I addresses 
international conflicts.  It strengthened the protection of civilian populations, 
especially by requiring that parties to conflicts at all times distinguish between 
civilian and military objectives and only attack the latter; by providing protection 
to cultural objects and houses of worship; by protecting the natural environment 
and civilian infrastructure; and by making provision for demilitarized zones which 
all parties must respect.  There is also a much greater elaboration of the 
fundamental rights of each person.
40  Finally, there are articles (77 and 78) 
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designed to give special protection to children.  In particular, children under the 
age of fifteen are not to take part in combat and should not be recruited.  For 
those recruited between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, priority is given to the 
latter when sending soldiers into combat.  Finally, special protection is still to be 
offered to children under fifteen even if they fight and are captured by the 
enemy.
41  
This new protocol governing international conflict posed an interesting but 
complex opportunity for African countries that in the 1970’s were heavily 
engaged in supporting the wars against the remaining white minority regimes.  
The African countries and their sympathizers throughout the third world 
desperately wanted the laws of international war to extend to national liberation 
struggles occurring in, among other places, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Rhodesia.  However, they did not want the laws of 
war to apply to all domestic disputes because they understood that they were 
themselves extremely vulnerable to rebellion, including secessionist threats.  In 
an extraordinary political win, third world countries were able to get Protocol I to 
extend the definition of international armed conflict to include conflicts in which 
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.”
42  
However, the Protocol does not apply to armed conflicts within a country that was 
not governed by a colonial regime. 
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To ensure that Protocol I could only be used against colonial regimes, 
regional organizations were appointed the gatekeepers to international 
recognition.  Thus, the Organization of African Unity has to recognize African 
rebel groups before they can gain an international personality.
43  The Arab 
League had a similar role in certifying the Palestinian Liberation Organization.  
This filter was a further reification of sovereignty because the OAU and other 
regional organizations are composed of sovereign states.  Indeed, the raison 
d’être of the OAU has been, despite its name, to preserve the sovereign status of 
African countries.
44   
  Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Convention does apply to internal 
conflicts other than national liberation struggles against a colonial power. Many of 
the same protections are offered to the civilian population, including essentially 
similar guarantees for children in combat (Article 4).
45  However, for the protocol 
to be invoked, a classic belligerency has to be recognized.  Under commonly 
accepted international law, a belligerency is said to occur where 1)  there are 
general hostilities;  2)  the rebels act like an army;  3)  they have an effective 
command;  4)  they control substantial territory and 5)  third states recognize 
them as belligerents.
46  Not surprising, states, in general have jealously guarded 
their prerogative to fight domestic opponents and have refused to recognize that 
a belligerency is occurring in their country. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill note, 
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“Relatively few states involved in internal hostilities have been willing to abandon 
their presumptive claim to a free hand in dealing with local threats, so that the 
applicability of Additional Protocol II is resisted, even where the objective criteria 
are satisfied. . . The scope for legal protection in a non-international armed 
conflict or violent internal strife situation is thus much less than in a traditional 
inter-State conflict.”
47  Schindler concluded that, “In no civil war since 1945 has 
belligerency been recognized. . . The disappearance of the recognition of 
belligerency coincides with the decline of neutrality.  Most States today, both in 
international and civil wars, prefer not to be bound by the rules of the law of 
neutrality.”
48  Thus, even in El Salvador, where there was a brutal and long-
running civil war, the government was unwilling to apply the provisions of 
Protocol II despite the fact that it had ratified the instrument.
49 
No state would want to recognize a belligerency within its borders.  
However, Protocol II provided a particularly inappropriate set of incentives to 
states to treat an insurgency according to the new laws of war because a state 
could only be worse off if it tried to apply humanitarian provisions. Therefore, 
once African states had reclassified the conflicts they wanted to receive extra 
protection as “international,” they were content to see that the effective 
regulations that might govern internal conflict were as weak as possible.  In 
particular, the possibility of providing a legal personality to rebels other than 
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through the improbable route of recognition as a classical belligerency was 
foreclosed.  
The failure to better regulate domestic conflict at a time when guerrilla war 
was becoming the predominant form of conflict was ultimately a reflection of who 
made international law.  As Suter notes, international humanitarian law was not 
“effectively extended  to cover guerrilla warfare because there was insufficient 
political commitment by the governments, by the NGOs, by the UN Secretariat or 
by the ICRC.”
50  As a result,  “when it came to the crunch” states were not willing 
to create a powerful protocol for the type of war that really mattered.”
51 The 
conservatism of diplomats, especially in conferences of sovereign states, where 
maintaining consensus is critical to achieving some kind of final product, made 
such new thinking impossible.  Suter concluded that pressure by NGO’s on 
conferences of sovereign states is unlikely to succeed because of the interests of 
the states themselves.  Therefore, non-governmental organizations, “must look 
beyond  simply creating  the issue and maintaining pressure on governments” 
but, instead, inject that new thinking themselves in order to change the nature of 
the debate.
52 
   Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child came about because of the 
agitation of many non-governmental groups and the success of UNICEF, and 
particularly of its director James Grant, in focussing attention on the plight of 
children. Western states were the principle drafters of the Convention and only 
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three African countries (Algeria, Morocco, Senegal)  even attended the working 
group sessions.  The failure of African countries to engage during the long 
drafting process was probably less lack of interest then a reflection of their limited 
diplomatic personnel resources compared to the very large delegations western 
countries maintain in New York and Geneva.  However, African states were 
among the quickest in ratifying the Convention.
53  The quick ratification was due 
to enthusiasm for the Convention and because many African states, always 
concerned about their international status, view ratifying such international 
documents as one more re-affirmation of their sovereignty. 
The Convention covered a wide range of child rights including naming, 
rights to speech and assembly, protection from neglect, and to a variety of social 
services.  However, the protections offered to children in armed conflict were not 
impressive.  Article 38  first asked states to apply international humanitarian law, 
something they were already required to do.  Second, the Convention reaffirmed 
that children under the age of fifteen not take part in hostilities and that there was 
a presumption against recruiting children between the ages of fifteen and 
eighteen.  Finally, the Convention again asked states to protect children in armed 
conflict according to their existing international obligations.  Article 39 on the 
responsibilities of states to promote physical and psychological recovery from 
violence, including armed conflict, did break new ground but these provisions 
obviously did not affect the actual conduct of hostilities.
54   
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  The Convention, as with most international law, was clearly a reaffirmation 
of the sovereignty of African countries.  This was hardly a surprise given that the 
Convention was written by sovereign states but the notion of new rights for 
children gave further prominence to the false idea  that international humanitarian 
law somehow degrades sovereignty.  The Convention made it clear that 
responsibility for implementing international human rights law lies first and 
foremost with the state.  In the Convention on the Rights of the Child, state 
parties are charged to undertake to “respect and ensure” the rights in the 
Convention.
55 
   Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
  There was especially great unhappiness that the Convention had not 
raised the age of recruitment for children in combat.  Indeed, African countries 
were in some ways ahead of the Convention because they had already raised 
the minimum age to participate in conflict to eighteen.  The Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the African Child of 1990 had defined a child as under eighteen 
years old and states were directed in article 22(2) to, “take all necessary 
measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain 
in particular, from recruiting any child” and in article 22(3) to protect civilian 
populations in conflict, especially children. In a further innovation, the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child extends protection to children not 
only to international and internal armed conflict but also to “lower levels of 
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violence and to ‘tension and strife.”
56  However, only state parties are recognized 
as responsible for guaranteeing child rights.  There is nothing in the Charter 
about rebel groups, continuing the African allergy to any recognition of rebels that 
challenged African states. 
Over six years, between 1994 and 2000, there was a tremendous 
grassroots effort by international non-government organizations to redress what 
were seen as the flaws in the Convention, especially as they related to protection 
of children during conflict.  The rise of the phenomenon of child soldiers in the 
1990’s, especially in the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, helped focus 
international attention on the problem as did an important report by Graça 
Machel, widow of the former President of Mozambique and now the wife of 
Nelson Mandela.
57  In addition, the inclusion of  using children under fifteen in 
combat as a war crime by the newly created International Criminal Court gave 
further impetus to the effort.
58  
The international Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers included 
many of the most prominent non-governmental organizations in the world 
including  the African Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Amnesty 
International, Defence for Children International, Human Rights Watch, 
International Federation Terre des Hommes, The International Save the Child 
Alliance, the Refugee Service, the Latin American Coalition to Stop the Use of 
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Child Soldiers, Quaker UN Office and   World Vision International.
59  These 
organizations were outraged by the child soldier issue and undoubtedly helped in 
their campaigning by the opposition of the US government, already the recipient 
of international opprobrium because of its failure to sign the treaty on landmines, 
which feared that the voluntary recruitment of seventeen year old could be 
adversely affected.  Finally, these organizations justify their existence, in part, 
through their work on international humanitarian law so that it was useful for them 
to keep the pot boiling.  The impressive degree of mobilization around the child 
soldier issue certainly validates Keck and Sikkink’s argument that transnational 
advocacy networks have organized most effectively when the “issues involve 
bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear 
causal chain” or when issues involve legal equal opportunity.
60 
  The new Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
was agreed to in January 2000.  It raises minimum the minimum age for 
participation in hostilities from 15 to 18 but allows recruiting of 17 year olds as 
long as “all feasible measures” are taken to keep them out of conflict.  However, 
the Protocol continues the practice of international humanitarian law respecting, 
to an extraordinary degree, the rights of sovereign states.  The Optional Protocol 
(Article 4(1)) prohibits armed groups opposing government from even recruiting 
children under eighteen, a stronger provisions than is applied to states.  In 
addition, the Optional Protocol (Article 4(3)) notes that if armed rebel groups 
accept this higher standard of action, “The application of the present article under 
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this Protocol shall not affect the legal status of any party to an armed conflict.”
61 
Thus, third world countries managed to have it both ways:  they seemingly made 
it more difficult for rebels to fight than for governments and they explicitly 
declared that even if the rebels do follow international law they would not have a 
legal personality.  It was another win for sovereignty. 
States, International Law, and African Children 
  One of the clearest claims regarding the mobilization around human rights 
at the international level is the diminishment of sovereignty. For instance.  Keck 
and Sikkink “We do find. . . that enough evidence of change in the relationships 
among actors, institutions, norms, and ideas exists  to make the world political 
system rather than international society of states the appropriate level of 
analysis”
62   However, in the case of regulating states’ ability to combat rebels 
while trying to protect children, perhaps the paradigmatic expression of 
sovereignty, there has been no obvious diminishment of sovereignty.  
Fundamentally, states are allowed to determine whether the conflicts within their 
own borders justify international attention (as is the case with both Article 3 and 
Protocol II). The failure to address the issue of who determines the nature of a 
conflict—perhaps the most important issue in governing the international 
regulation of a domestic conflict--starkly suggests that at every turn sovereignty 
has been respected, preserved, and, in fact, enhanced. 
  Undoubtedly part of the reason that sovereignty has not been a palpable 
victim of the campaigns to enhance international humanitarian law is that the 
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forums in which the law is produced are composed of states.  States might be 
more vulnerable to international pressure on an individual basis when campaigns 
can focus on their behavior and other states may be too embarrassed to come to 
their aid.  However, international conferences of states provide strength in 
numbers.   
  In addition, it is also important to note that the countries that are potentially 
affected by the international protection of children are among the poorest in the 
world with profoundly disrupted local civil societies.  Networks of domestic and 
international NGO’s might be most powerful in countries which are stable and 
which seek further integration into global society.  For instance, Keck and Sikkink 
note that human rights activists were most successful in Mexico between 1988 
and 1994, when many domestic NGO groups were being formed
63  and when the 
Mexican government was keen to gain approval of NAFTA. In contrast, African 
states and others that are potentially threatened by international humanitarian 
law have relatively few domestic NGO’s.  In addition, the likely benefits of further 
international integration for many of these failing states is probably not high but 
they may calculate that they face the real possibility of domestic armed rebellion.  
As a result, they are much more likely to guard their sovereignty and much less 
likely to be susceptible to pressures from non-governmental organizations, 
despite the fact that they are quite weak by global standards.  Indeed, it is their 
very weakness that makes them less vulnerable to the type of pressure that can 
be brought about by international human rights networks.   
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Compliance 
  Given that international humanitarian law has not effectively challenged 
sovereignty, compliance with the new international norms has been problematic.  
What then is the value of all of the promulgations that international society has 
made about the rights of the child during war?  Further, why did non-
governmental organizations  and sympathetic governments continue to pressure 
for the Optional Protocol when it was obvious that the other international 
instruments protecting children were not being followed?  A study for UNICEF 
argues that the value of the successive documents lies in the realm of moral 
suasion: “It is worth re-emphasizing that the power of humanitarian law does not 
lie only in the fact that its principles are in the form of legal instruments.  This only 
adds additional weight.  The power of humanitarian principles arises from the fact 
that they form a moral code rooted in  a concept of the common good in the 
public conscience of men, women and children around the world and that those 
who violate them do so at the expense of their own legitimacy in the minds of 
humankind.”
64  Thus, the argument for raising the age of combatants to eighteen 
in the Optional Protocol was that it would send a strong signal that the 
international community always found it unacceptable for children to be in 
armies, much less in combat. 
  Of particular interest is that NGO’s and sympathetic governments believe 
that they can influence the actions of rebel groups—the same ones that the 
international codes have gone to some length to not recognize and to 
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disadvantage—to behave better.  The Machel report argued that, “Many non-
state entities aspire to form governments and to invoke an existing Government’s 
lack of respect for human rights as a justification for their opposition. In order to 
establish their commitment to the protection of children, non-state entities should 
be urged to make a formal statement accepting and agreeing to implement the 
standards contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.”
65 The groups 
promoting the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child—
which treats rebel groups particularly poorly—also argued that, “the desire for 
international recognition by some of those groups would curb the most extreme 
cases of putting children into combat.”
66 
  The moral suasion argument is potentially useful because it gets around 
the sovereignty issue by justifying setting high humanitarian norms that might not 
actually be implemented in the near future but which could serve as an eventual 
goal.  However, what is continually striking about  the pronouncements of NGO’s, 
international organizations, and foreign governments is that they do not seem 
prepared to actually use moral suasion as a carrot.  In the various human rights 
campaigns in favor of children, there has not been any pressure on governments 
to declare that their internal conflicts justify international regulation.  Human 
rights groups often proclaim that chapter three of the Geneva Convention applies 
to a particular situation but there is usually no discussion of how the international 
community will reward countries for recognizing the application of international 
humanitarian law or will be delegitimated if they do not.  
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The same tactical problem applies to rebels.  The explicit bargain 
proposed is that if rebel groups obey international norms, they will get some kind 
of recognition from the international community.  Yet, the actual rhetoric directed 
at rebel groups by non-governmental organizations and foreign states does not 
provide any such incentive.  For instance, Human Rights Watch’s 
recommendations to the Lord’s Resistance Army was, in its totality, to:  
“immediately stop abducting children;  immediately stop killing children;  
immediately stop torturing children;  immediately stop sexually abusing children;  
immediately release all children remaining in captivity;  ensure that Lord’s 
Resistance Army combatants respect the human rights of civilians in areas of 
conflict.” Human Rights Watch does not suggest what type of international 
recognition the LRA would get if it were to take these actions.  Nor in its 
recommendations to the Ugandan government or the international community 
does Human Rights Watch suggest what type of recognition should be given to 
the LRA if the rebels were to carry out these reforms.
67  It can, of course, be 
argued that these norms should be respected no matter what the international 
community does but  the justification for setting relatively high international norms 
was that moral suasion could then be used to accelerate compliance. 
  Human Rights Watch might find the Lord’s Resistance Army so repulsive 
that even if the rebels agreed to respect the international humanitarian norms 
with regard to children, they should still not receive any international recognition.  
However, the advice to the Ugandan government is still perplexing because 
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Human Rights Watch does not urge the Ugandan government to do the one thing 
that would appear logical if the LRA is, in fact, an inherently evil entity:  win an 
outright military victory.  Instead, Human Rights Watch urges the Ugandan 
government to be careful while fighting but it does not urge that the LRA be 
defeated.  Human rights groups seem to be profoundly conflicted:  they are 
willing to provide advice on how combat should proceed but they shy away from 
any conclusion about how combat should end even when, as is the case of the 
LRA, they have clearly implied that the atrocities committed against children and 
other civilians are absolutely unacceptable. 
  Other campaigns directed at rebel groups and governments demonstrate 
a similarly perplexing use of the moral suasion argument.  For instance, Human 
Rights Watch urged all warring factions in Liberia to “disarm and demobilize 
immediately all fighters under the age of eighteen , and to refrain permanently 
from enlisting children under eighteen in the conflict.”
68  However, it does not 
indicate if the warring parties would receive some sort of recognition for these 
highly desirable reforms.   
  Similarly, UNITA, the rebel group in Angola, has pledged in its interim 
constitution that it will not recruit children under eighteen.
69  This pledge has 
largely been honored in the breach.  However, it is profoundly unlikely that even 
if UNITA were to implement its constitutional provision, that it would receive any 
sort of recognition or goodwill from the international community because 
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countries are skeptical of UNITA’s overall goals and the international community 
has now clearly indicated that it wants the Angolan government to win the war.  
Therefore, international sanctions have been imposed on UNITA although few 
foreigners actually pledge outright support for a military victory by the 
government.   
  Other NGO’s have the same problem.  For instance, World Vision’s 
position paper on children in armed conflict states that “ensuring respect for and 
compliance with international standards both by state and non-state actors must 
be a priority” and it goes on to express enthusiasm for the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  However, World Vision does not 
actually say how states or rebel movements are to be enticed to comply with 
international standards, especially what they will get if they comply.
70  The 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers condemns numerous rebel groups 
(including UNITA and FLEC in Angola, Hutu opposition groups in Burundi, the 
LRA in Uganda, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Sudan) but also 
does not say what international recognition these rebel groups will receive if they 
comply with international law.
71  
  Similarly, governments and international organizations have not gone 
beyond simply stating that moral suasion is useful.  The Machel report does not 
contain any recommendations on how to relate to rebel organizations that 
actually comply with international norms.  Nor did any nation in the long 1998 
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United Nations debate on children in armed conflict suggest a way of relating to 
rebel groups might respect international norms.  Yet, at the same time, there 
were no calls for governments to be encouraged to win outright military victories 
against rebels who did not respect international norms.
72 
New Ideas for International Humanitarian Law 
  It seems that there is an unbreachable gap between norms and 
compliance when international humanitarian law is applied to children in armed 
conflict.  The problem is not that the norms have necessarily been set too high.  It 
does seem reasonable that children under eighteen in almost all circumstances 
should not be involved in hostilities.  Nor is the problem a norm “overload:”  
international attention to the issues of children in conflict seems justified by the 
enormity of the human rights abuses.  The heart of the problem is that the 
international community has no way of getting around sovereignty.  
Yet, NGO’s and governments continue to do what they know how to do 
and have been doing for years:  writing more international law which basically 
reiterates already accepted practices or changes norms around the edges.  
These new humanitarian laws are written with the knowledge that they will not be 
enforced but no new thinking is given to how international practices (in particular 
how to relate to states in conflict and rebels) might be changed to gain 
compliance.  Ironically, NGO’s, which often promote themselves as the primary 
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challengers of state sovereignty, have been timid about challenging sovereignty 
when it comes to the protection of children. 
  What is clearly needed, as Suter recognized when the Optional Protocols 
to the Geneva Convention were adopted, is new international approaches to 
domestic armed conflict.  Such new international practices would allow the 
international community to determine what sort of international regulation should 
apply to domestic conflict, including if some form of recognition to rebels if it 
wanted to reward them for complying with international norms.  If the 
international community actually wants to remain neutral during a civil war, as is 
implied by the failure of many NGO’s and foreign governments to support outright 
military victories by African governments, then new practices should be 
developed which would allow for neutrality.    For the norms to be effective, new 
methods to promote compliance will have to be developed. 
  There had, in fact, in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, been a sophisticated 
intellectual effort made to try to distinguish between different types of civil conflict 
so that a more fine-grained version of international humanitarian law could be 
applied.
73   This effort was no doubt propelled by the wars in Southeast Asia 
where scholars were often in favor of international recognition of domestic 
combatants and by concerns of others that national liberation movements be 
recognized. That effort ended in part because the Optional Protocols to the 
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Geneva Convention were adopted and, in part, because the wars in Southeast 
Asia subsided.   
  However, there clearly needs to be a new effort to differentiate among 
conflicts so that the international community can apply the now comprehensive 
set of international laws relating to conflict and begin to relate to rebels. This 
effort might center around reviving classical understandings of international 
recognition of a belligerency so that outside parties could help determine the 
nature of the conflict and possibly develop some relationship to rebels or remain 
neutral in domestic conflicts.  The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child is a slight indication that the time for such an approach has come in 
Africa given that sovereignty in parts of the country is collapsing.  The role of the 
OAU as a gatekeeper to the international recognition of domestic parties during 
armed conflict provides the ideal avenue for Africans to begin to think about new 
approaches to relating to parties during domestic armed conflict. 
  Part of the new thinking about sovereignty will have to include new 
approaches to developing international norms and practices.  Having all the 
states of the world come together to adopt international humanitarian law 
towards domestic conflict is like recruiting criminals to write gun control laws.  
New ways of developing international practice will have to be found if there is to 
be more innovative practices that might ensure compliance.  At the very least, 
these new international efforts should include investigating the possibility of  
involving groups outside the state, including rebels, in adopting new practices.    34
Of course, such an approach might be the first step in rebels actually complying 
with international norms.  
Conclusion 
  There is nothing inevitable about the current state of the laws of war.  
Despite current rhetoric how human rights law challenges sovereignty, it is 
important to recognize that the law of war were actually more effective in the 
past. For instance, Quincy Wright found that international law with regard to the 
“status of rebels, the conduct of hostilities, and the rights and duties of neutrals” 
was continually referenced by both the protagonists and neutral governments 
during the American civil war.
74  It has been the international law of domestic 
conflict in the twentieth century that has privileged states.  In the current legal 
context, the effort to protect African children during times of conflict is a noble 
one but it threatens to exhaust itself by simply trying to propound ever more 
ambitious norms.  Much more attention will have to be given to compliance, 
including the difficult questions of who determines the nature of an armed conflict 
and how to relate to rebel groups during conflict.  The international community—
including governments, international organizations, and NGO’s—has now 
proclaimed for a decade how committed they are to African children.  It is time to 
simply stipulate that the commitment exists and begin the difficult job of 
investigating how to enforce the norms.  The ultimate test of seriousness will be if 
the international community no longer always values state sovereignty above the 
welfare of African children.  
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